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INTRODUCTION 
The problem immediately confronting a study of public 
relations in the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (popularly known as the World Bank) is one of 
delimitation. What, among the Bank's varied and extensive 
activities, can be properly construed as public relations? 
The answer cannot be made easily. When the free 
world's leading economists formed the World Bank at Bretton 
Woods in 1944, their minds were focused on developmental and 
financial plans, not on public relations. Nevertheless, since 
opening for business in June 25, 1946, the Bank has found itself 
engaging in work which could be justifiably labeled public rela-
tions. The Bank's reputation has gone far beyond that of an 
international money-man, a fact which prompted a feature writer 
to break out in this exaltation: 
11 who could have dreamed that the 
Bank would also win world-wide respect as an 
honest broker in international squabbles, as a 
mediator able to settle quarrels that erupted 
into the killing of men, and, most lustrous of 
all, as a diplomat able to prevent the killing of 
men? Here is an unexpected dividend, to be 
most gratefully acknowledged. It has resulted 
from a new kind of statecraft, one its adepts 
are pleased to call 'development diplomacy'. 11 1 
Purists may deny predicting this "development 
diplomacy" to the concept of public relations. However, the 
over-all effect of this statesmanship has been the creation of a 
2 
humanitarian image for the Bank with its subsequent rewards of 
public (in this case world-wide in scope) goodwill, esteem.)and 
acceptance. The attainment of such a favorable attitude toward 
the Bank is undoubtedly in the nature of a public relations achieve-
ment. 
PROJECTS DEVELOPING A CORPORATE IMAGE 
Three undertakings have mainly contributed to the en-
hancement of the Bank's image. None of them were premedi-
tated projects of a public relations counsel; the Bank does not 
maintain a public relations department. Rather, two of the 
undertakings were outgrowths of the Bank's marketing operations, 
while the third took the form of top-level mediations of economic 
disputes between certain nations. 
It is at this point that judgment has to be made whether 
an elaboration of the three undertakings should be included in 
this study. Inclusion seems relevant. The undertakings are 
3 
indeed of an economic nature, but, as stated before, their out-
\i!Otn'i'j 
\1.:ifte" is good public relations. Public relations men aim at defi-
nite results but their techniques often vary in relation to the 
different institutions served. Mass media, for instance, is not 
their only instrument. The wider the span of approaches open to 
their use, the more effective they become. 
An understanding of the Bank's external public provides 
an apt starting point for a description of these three PR-oriented 
functions. Between these two elements -- the Bank's public and 
the undertakings in question-- there are distinct parallelisms. 
The World Bank, somewhat like its ordinary domestic 
counterpart, has a public roughly divisible into four globe-
spanning categories: 1) its stockholders; 2) its borrowers; 
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3) its securities market; 4) its civic community. 
RELATIONS WITH STOCKHOLDERS AND BORROWERS 
The Bank stockholders are 68 national governments. 
These member governments are in the paradoxical position of 
also being the Bank's borrowers. Thus, from the start, lending 
policy was a delicate proposition demanding consummate diplo-
macy. The plutocratic corporate structure of the Bank resulting 
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from the determination of voting rights by the size of capital 
subscriptions hardly eased the situation. In its initial years the 
Bank experienced constant pressure from its directors to grant 
\t/ 
quick fat loans to the exten~ that its second president called the 
board "the borrowers 1 union. 11 Although proposed projects were 
impractical, inadequately designed, or even pure will-a-the-wisp, 
countries eagerly sought loans, sometimes with the naive deter-
mination of getting some money while the Bank's uncommitted 
funds lasted. 
It became a task to convince poorer countries that the 
Bank was not a tree of money blooming in a public park. Bor-
rowers had to be educated. The process was unprecedented in 
banking history. It led to the first two PR-oriented undertakings 
cited above: technical assistance and training institutes. 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
Formalized technical assistance to its customers was a 
function not directly envisaged by the Bank's founders. They 
were indeed aware of what commercial banks long knew, namely, 
that advice and money are the two commodities bankers sell. 3 
But they were perhaps unprepared for large-scale advisory 
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operations and the fact that the Bank's status as a specialized 
U.N. agency(Jl::r"\'he world's pressing economic problems)de-
manded more than just the conference table type of talk between 
a farmer and his rural banker. 
Bank assistance first began with evaluation of specific 
'-~~~~v 
economic progrws submitted to it for financing. If a project 
appeared feasible, staff specialists or outside consultants were 
called in who, after investigation, drew up recommendations for 
further improvements or changes. These suggestions usually 
dealt with monetary and administrative arrangements, but grad-
ually, in the face of ill-conceived programs, emphasis shifted 
to formulation of industrial priorities and analysis of engineer-
ing blueprints. 
The ability of the Bank to furnish competent advice has 
heightened its reputation and gratified member governments in-
valved. This is reflected in a current tendency: more and more 
countries are requesting the Bank's help "in matters not directly 
connected with loan proposals. Such help has been particularly 
concerned with development programing. tr4 
In response the Bank has dispatched groups of special-
ists, always recruited on an international basis, to analyze 
national economies on a long-term basis. The findings of these 
survey missions are published in report form for efficient dis-
semination and for utilization by the country concerned and by 
other interested segments of the world community. As a rule, 
arrangements are made for translation of the report into the ver-
cular. 
In several cases the Bank has gone beyond mere ivory 
tower paperwork. In 1951, for instance, it assigned two staff 
members to active service with the Nicaraguan government to 
initiate steps for the implementation of the Bank's approved 
economic program. This, however, does not mean that the 
Bank limits itself to the supervision of project construction fi-
nanced by its loans. The Bank's overseas liaison assignments 
have also aided in putting into effect development efforts launched 
by the individual governments themselves. 
Moreover, the Bank has not restricted its assistance 
to its own resources. It has tapped experts from private organi-
zations and other U. N. agencies. Thus the scope of the Bank's 
advisory delegations has not been confined to finance. It has 
encompassed the wide range of man's fundamental material en-
deavors -- from agriculture to engineering. 
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In December 1961, the Bank announced establishment 
of a new development advisory service. The service, which is 
a permanent organizational enlargement of the Bank 1 s previous 
technical assistance, provides "a corps of expert talent avail-
able to furnish economic and financial advice to the governments 
of the less developed member countries of the bank, particularly 
in connection with the preparation and execution of development 
programs. 115 With this announcement, technical assistance be-
came a major tenet in the Bank's policy; it assumed almost 
equal importance with its lending operations. 
EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS 
The second main factor which has helped in divorcing 
the Bank from the conventional viper image of the international 
financier is its assumption of educational work. This training 
program, which is supposed to go hand-in-hand with the Bank's 
technical assistance, has developed along two lines. 
One line of action was the creation of an Economic 
Development Institute. Partially supported with money from 
the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the Institute is a miniature 
college offering seminar discussions, usually for a six-month 
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period, to senior government officials of less developed nations. 
The main goal of the Institute is to raise to expert and efficient 
professionalism the standard of economic management in develop-
ing countries. 
As the Institute's name implies, the curriculum empha-
sizes development economics. Nevertheless, other topics are 
periodically handled, such as foreign trade or fiscal policy. 
Strict screening is imposed on candidates for study at the 
Institute. The faculty is composed of a small permanent staff, 
plus the Bank's regular personnel and outside experts. Class-
room activity is often complemented with field trips within and 
outside the United States. 
The other form of educational service extended by the 
Bank is a General Training Program. Begun in 1948, the pro-
gram is similar to the Economic Development Institute in that it 
recruits its trainees from government officials of member coun-
tries. However, these trainees are mostly junior career men 
and are often the recipients of individualized training courses. 
Sessions last about half a year; subjects treated range from 
development planning to accounting. 
Unlike the Institute, the General Training Program 
9 
devotes considerable attention to acquainting particpants with the 
policies and procedures of the Bank. Thus the General Training 
Program has become a communications tool not only for impart-
ing technical knowledge but also information about and awareness 
.\t/ 
of the Bank to the world's governmental circles. Ilk' has effec-
tively, albeit unknowingly, substituted for direct advertising 
publicity which might have been somewhat incompatible with the 
sedate character expected of a highly specialized U. N. agency. 
EFFECTS OF ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING 
Another specific success of the Bank's technical assist-
ance and training program in the way of public relations is the 
forestalling of the complaint commonly lodged against banking 
houses, namely, their lack of understanding of human values. In 
a recent survey of relations between business firms and banks, a 
large percentage of businessmen regretted most banks 1 neglect 
of a customer's character and preoccupation with his financial 
condition. Bad risks are dropped like hot potatoes. The invar-
iable immediate result is disaffection; the ultimate outcome is 
often the loss of the client who is now inclined to discredit the 
bank's reputation within his business and social circles. 6 
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Without compromising the stability of its balance sheet, 
the Bank, by its educational policy, has refused to adopt this 
cold-blooded attitude of many financial institutions. Unqualified 
loan applicants are taught how to qualify. Thus the Bank's busi-
ness relations has had the barest chance of becoming impersonal 
decisions. 
The public relations effectiveness of this approach is 
also apparent when viewed in terms of long-run prospects. The 
Bank's technical aid and educational service produce potential 
customers for years to come. This is especially true in the case 
of junior government officials who sooner or later will find them-
selves holding positions of greater responsibility. These men, 
initiating or implementing economic and monetary projects, can 
be expected to turn to the Bank for loans, and their requests will 
carry both acceptable competence and that nostalgic loyalty 
usually reserved for the alma mater. 
RELATIONS WITH SECURITIES MARKET 
The technical assistance and training programs profferred 
by the Bank directly affected its stockholder- borrower public. 
The third segment of the Bank's public -- its securities market 
11 
-- was the object of another promotions campaign. In this ins-
tance, the question of public relations relevance brought up in 
the beginning of this study is sharply illustrated. 
The Bank was confronted with a marketing task, but 
successful completion of the task was blocked by what might be 
called an "attitude-opinion" obstacle. It was a difficulty des-
cribed by Bank authorities as "immediate and formidable. 11 
Clearly, public relations activity was called for, and the problem, 
though recognized as basically one of marketing, was handled 
accordingly -- by an extended information campaign. 
The Bank's 1944 formation at Bretton Woods was at-
I 
tended by a mood of gloom that ranged from pessimism to sus-
picion. American and foreign financial circles expressed doubts 
on the Bank's chances of success. Loans, made either directly 
to member countries backed by the Bank's guarantee or to the 
Bank itself, were considered by private investors as too risky. 
Yet, from the outset, the Bank fully realized that its paid-in 
capital resources were inadequate to meet the demand of less 
developed countries whose national goal, after political indepen-
dence had been achieved, focused with almost obsessive power on 
12 
economic rates of growth. 
The Bank had to tap private capital markets. It was 
decided to do this, not by guaranteeing loans as originally en-
visaged by the Bank's Articles of Agreement (a proced~re which 
would have carried the disadvantages of possible multiple interest 
rates and of lessened marketability of securities), but by selling 
the Bank's own bonds. American capital was the prime target. 
The campaign, which continues up to the present, began 
in 1947. It had two aspects: publicity and legislative lobbying. 
PUBLICITY EFFORTS 
The publicity was aimed at remedying the lack of accu-
rate information on the part of potential bond purchasers and 
business officials. The Bank was new and unknown. What was 
more, the economic construct underlying the Bank was, if not 
necessarily beyond conception, certainly novel and seemingly 
complex. And this poor cognitive situation was compounded by 
the addition of an emotional factor, namely, the traditional mis-
trust accorded international loans by investors. 
Two departments of the Bank cooperated in the dissemi-
nation of facts about the Bank. These were the Marketing 
Department and the Office of Information. The latter prepared 
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a substantial amount of printed material. Brochures describing 
the Bank's history, organization, operations, and policies were 
distributed. Papers of more specialized import furnished details 
of the Bank's issues for technical appraisal by financiers. In 
addition to the printed word, Bank staff members intensified the 
promotional effort by personal contact. 
In the initial years -- 1947 to 1951 -- the campaign was 
waged on a somewhat extensive scale. All major U. 5. financial 
centers were to be swayed. 1l'he strategy, which was partly a 
consequence of the diversity of marketing plans utilized, was not 
without fruit. In the five issues of this period, all heavily over-
subscribed, the Bank sold close to a half billion dollars. worth of 
securities. 
There was need, however, for a sustained and less hap-
hazard market if Bank lending were to progress on a steady trend. 
Thus in mid-1952, with the adoption of negotiated underwriting, 
information efforts were relatively channeled to a small number 
of investment syndicates, particularly those in Boston and New 
York. In turn these large institutions were to form secondary 
seller groups across the nation. 
It was a move designed to influence the "opinion leaders 11 
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of the money market, and its effectiveness is seen in the actual 
fulfillment of the Bank's hopes just prior to the assumption of the 
underwriting arrangement. 
"In adopting this method the Bank 
believed it would induce a continuing and active 
effort on the part of banks and investment houses 
involved to sell Bank bonds and to develop a 
broader market for them. It was also believed 
that the establishment of an informed and in-
terested group of investment houses and dealers 
would develop a ready and active market for 
World Bank issues in the United States. 11 7 
It is perhaps unscientific to measure the overall effec-
tivity of this information program in terms of bond sales cor-
related with an ordinate showing quantity of the printed word. Yet, 
if only for the sake of being able to state that the publicity program 
was worth the effort and expenditure, citation of figures can be 
more than tolerated. 
As of June 1960, the Bank had floated 15 issues on the 
U.S. market with an aggregate of $1,460 million. For the years 
1957-58 alone, when the Bank resorted to underwriting agree-
ments, a record of $675 million worth of bonds was purchased. 
LEGISLATIVE LOBBYING EFFORTS 
The spoken word also played a major role in establishing 
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acceptance of the Bank' s bond obligations. This was especially 
true in the legislative lobbying aspect of the campaign. In fact, 
lobbying had to precede the written material in almost all ins-
tances. 
The need for lobbying was inescapable and peremptory. 
When the Bank decided to distribute its own bonds, it discovered 
with stunned dismay that the Bank's obligations were not legal 
investment outlets for the majority of institutional investors. 
Based on the sad experience of international finance in the de-
faulting 1930's, fe~erallaws and laws of about 40 states prohi-
bited banks, insurance firms, pension and trust funds from deal-
ing in international securities. Amendments had to be passed 
exempting the Bank's securities from these existing regulations. 
To secure favorable legislation and to interest American 
finance, Eugene Black, Wall Street bond specialist, was sum-
moned to Washington D. C. in 1947. Black promptly commenced 
a nationwide tour. He became a one-man speaking bureau, adept 
at both formal speeches and coffee room arguments with governors 
and lawmakers. Within five months, a sufficient number of states 
had been persuaded to allow the Bank to sell $250 million in bonds. 
The celerity of Black's success earned him the presidency in 
16 
1949, a position he holds up to the present. By 1959 virtually 
all legal limitations had been removed throughout 48 states, in-
8 
eluding the District of Columbia. 
PUBLIC RELATIONS ROLE OF BANK PRESIDENT 
The public relations significance of Black should not be 
underestimated. Endowed with a strong personality and judicious 
financial expertise, Bla.ck1 s reputation has traced a rising trend 
of prominence. Today Black is a leading candidate for the Nobel 
peace award. But such is Black's identity with the Bank, that 
the man's public popularity has elevated, in equal measure, the 
Bank's prestige. Articles appearing in nationally-known, mass-
audience~ publications elaborate, for instance, on Black's finan-
cial wizardry and the Bank's massive hydro-electric projects in 
the same awed breath. Whether this tendency to personalization 
is beneficial or detrimental to the Bank in the long run can be a 
moot question, .but the fact remains that at present the impres-
sion of many people is that Black is the Bank, and the Bank, 
Black. So far the identity has strengthened the Bank's standing 
in the eyes of its varied public. 9 
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RELATIONS WITH THE CIVIC COMMUNITY 
The prestigious reputation of Black brings up the Bank's 
public relations with its fourth public, namely, its civic com-
10 
munity which is the entire free world. 
Black's efforts on behalf of the Bank has not been con-
fined to creating and sustaining the Bank1 s financial market and 
to formulating the Bank's judicious, no-nonsense loan policy. He 
has undertaken activities of a diplomatic nature hardly imagined 
at Bretton Woods. The assumption of such extra-curricular 
functions has earned for the Bank the distinction of being a "world-
saver" and a "do-gooder." 
This significant humanistic change within the Bank owes 
much of its force from Black himself who is known as a man of 
thought. Speaking at Tufts University in 1960 for the annual 
Clayton Lectures, Black revealed the psychic aspect of the Bank's 
ope rations. 
"What is needed from the West is what 
might be called a new sense of vocation in the 
world ... {which is) a willingness to work, 
adventurously, at concrete tasks simply with 
other nations and other peoples in the belief 
that in this way the balance of hope in a future 
consistent with the spread of individual free-
dom and tolerance among nations will be main-
tained. " 11 
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Asked later to explain further the word "vocation, " 
Black said: "when I use the word 'vocation, 1 I mean something 
important ... a sense of inner satisfaction, of trying to do the 
thing right. It 1 s exciting when you can~ what it means to those 
people. 11 12 
Thus in a way, Black has moved the Bank in a direction 
being followed by more and more corporations in modern society. 
This direction is that form of corporate conscience which is lead-
ing firms to bookkeep accounts not only of money but also of 
social values. This trend which regards management not merely 
as legal attorneys for shareholders but also trustees of the public 
interest, was the initial cause of much of public relations activity, 
and it is perhaps (if one has to be sought) the philosophical ra-
13 
tionale of the profession. 
In the concrete, this sense of social responsibility has 
taught the Bank to serve its fourth public, namely, the world at 
large. It started the Bank on its third PR-oriented undertaking, 
leading it along a climactic series of mediatory endeavors. 
In 1958, when the Suez Canal was nationalized, the 
Bank's officers acted as referees in an extremely complex settle-
ment of a dispute between the United Arab Republic government 
19 
and the stockholders of the Suez Canal Company. 
The next year, the Bank again stepped in as an accept-
able arbiter, disentangling the financial claims arising over the 
1956 Suez controversy between the governments of the United 
Arab Republic and the United Kingdom. 
1960 was likewise a busy year for the Bank's "develop-
ment diplomacy." The Bank first resolved a 30-year old dis-
agreement between the city of Tokyo and several French holders 
of its municipal bonds. 
Next the Bank stretched its pacifying hand to Central 
America, an area known for its propensity for intra-regional 
quarrels. The Bank created a Central American Development 
Bank to help El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua 
(and possibly Costa Rica too) work in a common market atmos-
phere, organizing industries and reducing the rate of unemploy-
ment. 
Also in 1960, and most significant of all because it 
meant the abortion of armed conflict, the Bank successfully ter-
minated nine years of 11pretty painful" negotiations between India 
and Pakistan. The dispute, following the birth of Pakistan in 
1947, centered over control of the waters of the six rivers in the 
20 
vast Indus basin. The settlement was begun by Black's personal 
initiative. After coming across a magazine article proposing the 
1-i-" / \Dr .rJ..{ ' .... ,.. 
erection of an Indus Valley Authority~ the fashion of another 
Tennessee Valley Authority, Black wrote the disputant nations 
and offered the Bank's services for negotiation purposes and the 
Bank's engineering and financial resources for construction of the 
project. 
The offer was accepted. A treaty was finally signed, 
launching a billion-dollar complex of irrigation canals, storage 
dams, and electrical power stations. The treaty also earned the 
Bank several hundreds of column inches in newspaper coverage, 
and the lasting gratitude, respect, and admiration of governments. 
All the public relations activities described above were 
not of an ex-officio nature. They were undertaken as occasion 
demanded, often with no forethought that such activities would 
effectively improve the Bank's status in the eyes of its vast and 
14 
varied public. The officials and staff-members involved were 
drawn from disparate sectors of the Bank's organization, It was, 
in a word, public diplomacy that employed the energies of the 
entire Bank: the skill of the engineer, the economist, the statis-
tician, the marketing man, and the mathematician. 
21 
FORMAL PUBLIC RELATIONS 
Nevertheless, it must not be concluded that the Bank 
haphazardly abandoned all public relations to the force of cir-
cumstances and to the initiative of any and all of the Bank's 
management. The Bank is among that growing number of finan-
cial institutions which realizes that a secretive business policy 
in the modern world of mass media can become a dilatory factor 
in fiscal growth. There is no vagueness about the Bank's policy 
regarding public relations, at least regarding one aspect of pub-
lie relations work. The Bank, as previously alluded to, does 
15 
maintain a regular Office of Information. 
FUNCTIONS OF BANK'S OFFICE OF INFORMATION 
The office is managed by a director and is on the same 
organizational level as the Bank's other 13 departments operat-
ing directly under the president's office. 
This Office of Information exercises the following func-
tions. 
It prepares publications of the Bank which includes the 
annual report, a picture annual called Loans at Work, and a 
number of pamphlets and leaflets issued at irregular intervals. 
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Besides printed publications, the Office puts out a considerable 
amount of mimeographed material, such as speeches of key 
officials or economic studies conducted for the Bank and allied 
agencies. 
The Office drafts press announcements of the public 
translations of the Bank, especially of loans and borrowings by 
the Bank. These press releases are usually distributed to busi-
ness editors all over the world. There are, on the average, 
about 70 announcements a year. 
A third responsibility of the Office is to maintain a har-
monious acquaintance with the press, in particular with financial 
editors and editorial writers. The Office likewise handles all 
inquiries from the press. 
The Office also prepares drafts of speeches and articles 
by the management and, more rarely, by other members of the 
operating staff. 
It has also the communications task of keeping investors' 
advisory service informed about forthcoming borrowings of the 
Bank and about the ope rations and financial condition of the Bank. 
The investment publications usually advised are Moody, Standard 
& Poor, and Fitch's. 
2.3 
Work of the Office is not limited to Washington and New 
York. A highly creative job-approach sends staff members of 
the Office to the field for first-hand observation of Bank-financed 
projects. Such observation becomes the basis for reportage on 
the projects, from which material is drawn for Bank speeches 
and publications. This material has also served newspapermen 
and magazine writers in the course of their preparing feature 
presentations on their own. 
In connection with the printed word aspect of its work, 
the Office maintains mailing lists which guide the distribution 
to the press and the general public of publications, press releases, 
speeches, and unclassified Bank reports. The last item, how-
ever, is not given a distribution spread as extensive as that of 
the other materials. 
The spoken word is, by no means, neglected. 
A speakers' bureau is maintained by the Bank. The 
Office arranges speaking appearances by management and staff 
before financial groups (e. g. associations of bankers), university 
and college audiences, and civic groups of various kinds, espe-
cially those interested in world affairs. 
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Likewise, when people visit the offices of the Bank in 
Washington, the Office of Information arranges programs and 
tours for them. This function, however, does not cover official 
visitors on operational business. 
The Office, of course, takes cognizance of the fact that 
the propagation of information finds one of its most effective 
channels in the audio-visual field. 
There is a photographic bureau in the Office. It has 
charge of distributing photographs to the press and of commis-
sioning photographic coverage of Bank operations in the field. 
The output of these pictorial coverages is supplemented by care-
ful culling of photographs from borrowers 1 reports to the Bank. 
A photographic library is also maintained. 
The 11th function of the Office is likewise along graphic 
lines. It entails the supervision of the production of films con-
cerning the operations of the Bank. 
The next function is publicity and dissemination of in-
formation by means of the radio. The Office arranges for record-
ings of talks to be broadcast through the facilities of the United 
Nations radio, the Voice of America network, and the national 
radio systems of borrowing countries. 
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Finally, the Office has charge of answering mail and 
telephone inquiries about the Bank from the public, both here and 
abroad. 
PERSONNEL OF OFFICE OF INFORMATION 
The other side of the preceding functional organization 
of the Office is its personnel set-up. 
There are {as of mid-1961) 13 professionals on the staff 
of the Office. The Office is managed by a director and an assist-
ant director. While either one may find himself tending to any 
aspect of the business of the Office, the assistant director is 
especially concerned with publications. The director has charge 
of planning information programs on a broad scale and of handing 
out assignments. 
The other 11 staff members with their designations are 
as follows. 
A press assistant: he looks after the functions involving 
publications and the general press. A financial press assistant: 
he has the functions dealing with financial writers and editors out-
side Washington D. C., in particular those in New York handling 
investment guides. Three writers: these prepare drafts of Bank 
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publications, speeches of management, and first-hand reports on 
Bank projects outside the country. A public affairs assistant: 
he is concerned with scheduling speaking engagements, guiding 
office tours, and supervising film productions. A visual and 
radio assistant: he coordinates the photographic and radio opera-
tions of the Office. Finally, a distribution assistant: he has 
charge of the mailing lists and replies to all inquiries from the 
public. 
In addition to this office staff, the Office of Information 
has a Director of Information for Europe. The position has the 
responsibility of analyzing the communications situation across 
the Atlantic. As information needs of specific individuals or 
audiences in Europe arise, arrangements are made for the ser-
vices of the Washington D. C. personnel. 
There is also an information adviser for Latin America. 
His task is similar to that of the European director of informa-
tion, except for the fact that he stays and works in Washington 
D.C. 
Besides these two, there is no other regional represen-
tation in the Office. Members of the staff, however, regularly 
visit certain countries in Africa and Asia. 
27 
EVALUATION OF OFFICE OF INFORMATION 
From a description of the preceding functions, it is 
readily seen that, although the Office of Information has no direct 
function in marketing, it does concern itself with creating a 
favorable climate of opinion for the Bank's marketing activities. 
In the Bank, the distinction between direct sales promotion and 
public relations is kept. It is not difficult to do this because the 
Bank does not engage in out-and-out commercial advertising. 
An analysis of the work and productions of the Office of 
Information indicates that the general objective aimed at is to aid 
the operations of the Bank. The specific goals on the other hand 
are: 1) the maintenance of confidence and respect of investors; 
2) the creation and continuance of understanding and cooperation 
from officials and publics both of countries which supply capital 
to the Bank and of countries which receive loans from the Bank. 
RELATIONS WITH THE ACADEMIC WORLD 
Moreover, the Office of Information, in conjunction with 
the educational and assistance programs of the Bank, is beginning 
to serve a communication need which has arisen quite recently. 
At present it is gradually being felt that there should be more 
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contact between the Bank and a new public -- the academic world. 
Economists have occa,sionally implied that the Bank 
needs more theoretical research as a basis for its operations. 
The Bank, they say, seems to be indifferent to the value of gene-
ral theories and has remained unheedful of the inadequacy of the 
classical theory of development which pre-supposes the existence 
of a stable institutional framework on which to build. 
A Princeton University essay on international finance 
stressed this need of a close and constant rapport between the 
Bank and the schools. 
"Just as it is important to national 
administrations that there should be informed 
critics able to express an independent view on 
the policies that they are pursuing, so the 
Bank stands in need of skilled comment by 
independent experts. Such comment is most 
likely to come from academic economists and 
the Bank should seek it actively by ensuring 
that suitable opportunities are created. This 
is another reason why publication of documents 
and occasional conferences are of value: they 
not only spread information but force the re-
viewer or the speaker to take a position for or 
against the views expressed. " 16 
That the efforts at disseminating information is proving 
its effectivity in this regard can perhaps be seen in the light of 
recent enlargements in the Bank's organization, whereby a 
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Development Advisory Service and a new Department of Opera-
tions for Africa were created. Besides financial matters, both 
these offices will deal with the technicalities of development 
programming which will presumably draw from the expertness of 
academic circles. 
Likewise, the Bank has initiated experimental research 
which may develop into a systematic practice. It has invited re-
nowned scholars, like Professor Tinbergen, to conduct studies 
on selected problems of development which are later to appear 
17 
in printed form. In addition, a plan has been suggested to 
sponsor conferences between Bank officials and academic econo-
mists on selected topics. 
CONCLUSION 
In its 16-year history, the Bank has shown remarkable 
progress. It has been capable of altering and adapting methods 
to suit changing economic circumstances. For its relations with 
its five publics -- stockholders, borrowers, securities market, 
the world community, and academic circles -- it has manifested 
a progressive, enthusiastic, and intelligent concern. 
This concern has been effective and beneficent. If 
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judgement has to be made, it can be said that the Bank has good 
public relations. It is prestigious and it is well-liked. 
The Bank's successful public relations may appear para-
doxical. The Bank has never been bent on all-out publicity. In 
fact it would perhaps rather seek obscurity if given the choice. 
Its Office of Information does not plan intensive promotions cam-
paigns. 
Then, why has the Bank become a luminary in the eyes 
of the world, succ~ing within a relatively short period in oblit-
erating the demonical conception of international finance fixed in 
the popular mind by the chaotic post World War I years? 
The answer lies in the quality of the Bank's management 
and staff. The Bank has revealed its purposefulness by the high 
calibre of its men. This competency has drawn the respect of 
able men in the countries the Bank serves. 
In doing so, the Bank has followed one of the principal 
tenets of public relations. Before anything else, it performed 
splendidly; it firmly established its credibility; it identified its 
work with society's interests. Thus excellent public relations 
came naturally, as it does when the situation is not the remedying 
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of an embarrassing position but the revelation of good deeds. 
Hence, it can be expected that the greater burden of 
further communications activity would be the legitimization for 
an ever-increasing audience of the Bank's achieved status. 
Coupled with thorough financial competency, this activity should 
maintain the Bank in that lively and enduring existence which has 
been the crown eluding most international organizations. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 Peter Lyon, 11A World of Money," Holiday, XXIX 
(May 1961), p. 62. 
2 Bertrand Canfield, Public Relations {Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1960), pp. 85-86. 
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3 George Katona, Business Looks at Banks {Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1957), pp. 53-54. 
4 Anonymous, The World Bank {Washington D. C.: 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1960), 
p. 8. 
5 Anonymous, The Manila Daily Bulletin , CLXXXIX 
(December 19, 1961), p--:A.. 
6 Katona, ..£E..:_ .£!!..:., p. 29. Here is a typical response to 
Katona's survey questionnaire: "The trouble with a lot of bankers 
is that they look only at a paper -- they aren't interested in the 
man wanting to do business with them. Is he honest? What is 
his personal background? It seems that you can't get a big banker 
to analyze all of those things. All they can analyze is how much 
you have got in your corporation. 11 
7 Anonymous, The World Bank , pp. 89-90. It is in-
teresting to observe that educators are still engaged in hypothe-
sizing the two-step flow of communication while their business-
men confreres are already practicing it. 
8 
One must not overlook the fact that after the U. S. 
money market had been tapped, the Bank under Black's leader-
ship turned its attention to attracting foreign capital. That this 
endeavor was equally successful is proven by the 1959 figure of 
$1,032 million held by foreign investors from 40 countries. The 
amount constitutes 51 percent of the Bank's direct and guaranteed 
obligations. 
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9 From a recent Katona survey of banks it appears that 
of all types of corporations banks carry the most personalized 
image: people invariably think of the banker, and business re-
lationships is influenced less by a cheap rate of interest than that 
cf..,...il,&; -+~ "believe in a banker. 11 
10 Of the countri~s behind the Iron Curtain only 
Yugoslavia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia took out membership 
in the Bank. Poland, however, withdrew in 1946 and C~~chos­
lovakia was suspended in 1953 for failure to pay its capital subs-
cription balance. The Red bloc nations can well be the target of 
the Bank's next public relations endeavor. 
1l L 't 106 yon, ..£E.:_ E.!._:. , p. . 
12 L 't OC, Cl. 
13 The movement, dubbed as the "20th century capitalist 
revolution, 11 is the subject of provocative discussion by academic 
notables like A. Berle, E. Mason, and the late E. Dodd. 
14 
"When I talked with Black, I asked him whether he 
had any comparable (to the India-Pakistan settlement) schemes 
that might provoke another handful of headlines . . . He grinned 
and shook his head. 'You don't go looking for those things,' he 
said. tt Lyon, ~· cit. , p. 106. 
15 The policy of maintaining an information office is 
shared by most large-sized financial institutions like insurance 
companies and investment and brokerage firms. 
16 Alec Cairncross, The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Developme~(Princeton: PrincetooUniver-
sity, 1959), p. 36. 
17 A portion of the Bank's printed material is handled 
by the Johns Hopkins University Press in nearby Baltimore. 
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